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Abstract 
 
 
This paper deals with the cultural and educational relations between the United 
States and Portugal during the Cold War. It is built upon the premise that cultural 
policies and cultural relations between states are a fundamental part of 
international relations. History of International Relations, therefore, should 
overcome an analysis based only upon political and diplomatic dimensions to 
address what can also be referred to as ‘cultural diplomacy’. The Cold War 
period, because of its historical features, is particularly relevant to the study of 
processes of cultural diplomacy and some authors even consider it as the ‘golden 
age’ of cultural diplomacy.1  
 
Introduction 
 
The history of international relations between Portugal and the United States 
shows us that in the early years of the Cold War there was a gradual integration 
of Portugal within the US sphere of influence in Western Europe. From a political 
and military point of view, this integration was confirmed by several bilateral 
agreements between the two nations, giving the Americans base rights in the 
islands of the Azores, by Portugal's participation in the Marshall Plan and by the 
invitation to be a founding member of NATO, in 1949. It is questionable, 
however, whether this political and economic process of integration had parallel 
on the cultural level. After all, for the Portuguese regime, led by Oliveira Salazar 
since 1932, and for a society like the Portuguese, predominantly rural, 
conservative, and catholic, the United States seemed to represent, as George 
Kennan once wrote, the ‘immorality’ of Hollywood and the ‘materialism’ of Wall 
Street. American cultural hegemony, therefore, was never a reality in Portugal in 
the early years of the Cold War.2 
Within this political context, and based on original sources from 
Portuguese archives, this paper represents a first approach to educational 
exchanges between Portugal and the United States in the early years of the Cold 
War, examining the evolution from the first reluctant contacts and exchanges in 
the late 1940s until the signature of a Fulbright agreement and the creation of 
the Portuguese-American Cultural Commission in 1960. In the end, we try to 
evaluate the significance of educational exchanges for the larger history of US-
Portugal relations in the Cold War period. 
Portugal and the United States during the Cold War 
 
The history of Portuguese-American cultural relations during the Cold War has 
not been written yet.3 A good starting point for this endeavor may be an 
assessment of the prejudice and disdain of Oliveira Salazar, the leader of the 
Portuguese government from 1932 until 1968, for the United States and for the 
cultural and ‘civilizational’ principles this country stood for, in the eyes of the 
Portuguese dictator. The United States, Salazar wrote in November 1943, have a 
‘lack of knowledge’ of European ‘businesses and problems: very wealthy […] very 
young, they do not feel our needs, and cannot not have the same political views’. 
For the Americans, everything was ‘simpler, straightforward, less formal’, with 
no regard for ‘our mental requirement of logic’ and ‘scruples of juridical 
positions’, without the ‘delicacy’ and ‘flexibility’ that characterized ‘European 
intellect’.4 Salazar’s position was not much different from other European 
leaders of that time, reflecting the idea that US culture, specially ‘high culture’ 
was somehow ‘inferior’ to European standards. From a cultural point of view, the 
major influence in Portuguese cultural and intellectual circles, in the early years 
of the Cold War were France, Germany or the United Kingdom. 
From a political point of view, however, the most salient development in 
US-Portuguese relations during the last period of World War II and in the early 
years of the Cold War was the integration of Portugal in what can be called the 
American sphere of influence. A neutral country during World War II, Portugal 
gradually perceived that an alliance with the United States, the belonging, more 
or less explicit, to the American sphere of influence was essential for the 
maintenance of the regime and the colonial empire after the war. This process of 
rapprochement with the United States was not linear and faced strong resistance 
within the regime and especially from Oliveira Salazar himself. The Portuguese 
leader always looked with suspicion to what he thought were the imperialist 
ambitions of America in Europe, Africa and the world in general. He continued to 
imagine a post-war international order in which the United Kingdom would 
remain as the dominant power and Euro-African links would allow Western 
Europe to remain a pillar in the international system. The rise of the United 
States to a hegemonic position was a scenario that worried Salazar because it 
would mean the preponderance of a democratic power with a markedly anti-
colonialist discourse. Sooner or later, he suspected, these principles would come 
into confrontation with the type of regime in Portugal and with the maintenance 
of the Portuguese colonial empire.5  
The integration of Portugal into the Western bloc was largely facilitated 
by the importance of the military base the United States utilized in the Azores 
since World War II. In the immediate postwar period, the Azores continued to 
play a key role in US-Portuguese relations and to function as a vehicle for the 
integration of Portugal in the new international order that emerged with the 
Cold War. The existence of an American base in the islands was one of the 
vertices of the new American plan to create a vast system of naval and air bases 
scattered all over the globe. Accordingly, after negotiations, that were always 
difficult and prolonged, Portugal and the United States signed several 
agreements renewing the American presence in the Azores: in 1946, 1948 and 
1951.6  
On the other hand, this process also took place at an economic level. In 
this context, it is essential to consider the participation of Portugal in the 
Marshall Plan, for which it was officially invited in July 1947. Portugal accepted 
the invitation, seen as a way to offset Soviet veto over its participation in the UN 
and also as a way to avoid international isolation of the regime. Initially, 
however, Portuguese authorities rejected the American financial aid, considering 
the country did not need to be a part of the ‘queue of those hungry for dollars’. 
Accordingly, Portugal only came within the ERP in 1948 when it faced serious 
financial and economic challenges. In 1949 the Portuguese government accepted 
$625 million in aid via the Program.7 
Finally, in this process of reluctant but gradual integration of Portugal 
into the Western community, we should mention Portuguese participation in 
NATO. Portugal was invited to participate in the Atlantic Alliance because of the 
strategic value of the Azores.8 The Azores military bases were defined by the 
Secretary General of NATO, in 1950, as 'the most important contribution which 
Portugal could make to NATO defense'.9 Like the Marshall Plan, NATO was an 
excellent opportunity for the international integration of Portugal and for its 
alignment with the West in the bipolar scenario that characterized the Cold War. 
Therefore, in 4 April 1949 Portugal signed the Treaty of Washington, becoming a 
founding member of NATO. Two years later, in 1951, Portugal and the United 
States would sign two key agreements that regulated the bilateral relations 
between the two countries for the following decades. The first agreement, signed 
in January 1951, was a 'Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement', similar to the 
agreements signed between the United States and other members of NATO, 
under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.10 The second one, signed in 
September 1951, was a 'Defense Agreement between the United States and 
Portugal respecting Use of Facilities in the Azores'.  This agreement formally 
granted the United States the use of the Azores base 'in case of war in which they 
are involved during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty'. In times of peace, 
however, the United States were only allowed to remain in the Azores for a 
period of five years.11 The Portuguese government wanted to avoid a permanent 
US military presence in Portuguese territory and it was able to impose 
negotiations every five years for the renewal of authorization in times of peace. 
Thus, American troops were only authorized to remain in the Azores until 
September 1956 and the agreement had to be renegotiated and eventually 
renewed in 1957, allowing the United States to remain for another five years. 
Educational Exchanges in the early Cold War 
 
It was within this context of US-Portugal relations during the Cold War period, 
that educational exchanges between the two countries began to took place. US 
cultural diplomacy programs, however, had a slow start in the early Cold War. In 
the five years that followed the end of World War II, as historian Jessica Gienow-
Hecht wrote, ‘Washington had very little interest in cultural matters in Europe’. 
The Truman administration did not have a consensual vision on the utility of 
cultural diplomacy and many American policymakers were ‘skeptical about 
whether the promotion of American values and culture abroad was appropriate 
at all’.12 
Nevertheless, several important initiatives were launched in the post-war 
years, including the Fulbright program. In 1946, President Truman signed the 
Fulbright Act that would allow, in the following years, the development of 
educational exchanges between the United States and other countries. The 
original bill had been introduced by Senator William Fulbright (D-AR) with the 
declared goal of ‘promotion of international good will through the exchange of 
students in the fields of education, culture and science’.13 The Fulbright program 
had already been identified as one of the most important tools in the ‘Cold War 
battle for the hearts and minds’14 and as a favourite way ‘the government can 
communicate with target foreign audiences’.15 
Two years later, in 1948, the United States Information and Educational 
Exchange Act (Public Law 80-402), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, was even 
more significant, authorizing the American government ‘to conduct international 
information, education, and cultural exchange activities on a worldwide, long-
term scale’ in order ‘to promote a better understanding of the United States in 
other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the 
United States and the people of other countries’.16 
Despite these two programs, in the early years of the Cold War, the United 
States did not have a clearly defined strategy to project its own cultural values 
and to promote educational exchanges with Western European countries. 
Portugal, despite its political and strategical importance, was certainly not one of 
the primary destinations of American cultural diplomacy. Being a dictatorship 
and a single party regime, with a deep and entrenched anti-communist discourse 
and practice, Washington did not believe Portugal would become a significant 
theatre of the ‘cultural battles’ of the Cold War or the target of any specific soviet 
propaganda program. Therefore, Portugal was not part of the initial Fulbright 
program. Educational exchanges between the two countries were managed by 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, initially called Division of Cultural 
Relations.17  
The exclusion of Portugal from the Fulbright program was also related to 
the way the program was financed. Since its creation, the Fulbright program was 
funded by the sale of a vast quantity of war surplus material that was scattered 
around the world, especially in Europe and in the Pacific region. Its geography, 
therefore, ‘was determined by the postwar distribution of surplus material’ that 
made the United Kingdom and France its major beneficiaries in Europe. As a 
neutral country during World War II, Portugal did not have any American 
surplus material in its territory and this was another reason why it was left out 
of the Fulbright program.18 
On the other hand, the Portuguese government, as seen above, was not 
very interested in promoting cultural and education exchanges with the United 
States. The dominant cultural reference in Portugal was French culture. 
Therefore, educational exchanges between the United States and Portugal only 
existed through isolated initiatives of students and professors and they generally 
faced many obstacles. 
Among these obstacles, the most paramount and difficult to overcome 
was the nature of the Portuguese regime. Salazar’s regime looked with suspicion 
to foreigners who wanted to visit the country19 and a formal authorization from 
the Portuguese political police (the PVDE) was mandatory and very difficult to 
obtain. In August 1945, an American student, Julia Bramlage, wanted to spend an 
Academic year at the University of Coimbra to improve her knowledge of 
Portuguese language. When she visited the Portuguese consulate in San 
Francisco she realized that she needed a special authorization from the 
Portuguese political police to apply for a Visa that would allow her to travel to 
Portugal.  Julia Bramlage made the request for that authorization and paid for it 
by herself. The Portuguese consul informed her the authorization would take 
between a week and a month to be ready and that it would be necessary that 
someone she knew could ‘follow the process in Lisbon’. The lack of reply from 
Portuguese authorities in Lisbon eventually prevented Bramlage to travel to 
Portugal in that academic year.20 In December 1945, the case was brought to the 
attention of the Portuguese Embassy in the United States by Manoel Cardozo, 
professor at the The Catholic University of America. Cardozo suggested that the 
Portuguese government should authorize the Portuguese Embassy in the USA or 
even the consulate services to process Visa requests by students who wanted to 
travel to Portugal, without consulting Lisbon to obtain the necessary license.21 
The Portuguese ambassador in Washington, João Bianchi, referred the 
matter to Lisbon, specifically to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, reporting the 
difficulties the student had found from the Portuguese immigration authorities 
and how she had decided to postpone her trip to Portugal for next year. The 
Ambassador suggested that if the Portuguese government was, ‘as I presume’, 
really interested in ‘promoting cultural exchanges’ by having American students 
attending Portuguese universities, it ‘should perhaps consider how to simplify 
their enrollments and other necessary steps’. For Bianchi, the House of Portugal 
in New York ‘could be the means for implementing’ this simplification, as long as 
it ‘received the appropriate directives’. In late February 1946, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs decided to pursue this matter, sending the case to the Ministry of 
Education and suggesting that ‘if there is interest to intensify cultural exchanges 
with the United States’ the government should promote ‘the simplification of 
formalities necessary to the frequency of our universities for international 
students’.22 
This lack of interest and initiative in receiving foreign students was 
visible not only at the government level, but also in Portuguese universities and 
other educational institutions, that were not prepared to receive foreign 
students and lacked specialized personnel to deal with the issue. In January 
1950, the School of Inter-American Affairs at the University of New Mexico in 
Albuquerque, complained about the difficulties in establishing contacts with the 
Universities of Lisbon and Coimbra. John F. Gallo wrote to the Portuguese 
Embassy in Washington, mentioning the existence of several students at that 
university who were specializing in Portuguese language and in History of 
Portugal. These students were ‘very interested’ in spending a school year in a 
Portuguese University, such as Lisbon or Coimbra. However, ‘letters sent for 
several months for the above named institutions were not answered’. For this 
reason the University of New Mexico requested the Embassy information 
regarding the ‘possibility of these students attend some higher education 
institutions in Portugal’. Specifically it was requested ‘information about 
admission requirements and, if possible [...] catalogs or other printed materials 
that can clarify this issue’.23 
A few days later, the new Portuguese ambassador in the United States, 
Pedro Teotonio Pereira, referred this matter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
drawing his attention to ‘the fact that some students from the University of New 
Mexico who wrote to the Universities of Coimbra and Lisbon did not receive a 
reply to their letters’. This was not the ‘first time that such cases are referred to 
the Embassy’. As the ambassador explained, this was a sensitive question 
‘because professors and students from American schools – whose information 
services are generally remarkable – do not understand that the same does not 
happen with educational institutions in other countries, especially when it comes 
to universities with great tradition and reputation abroad’. The ambassador 
drew attention to this matter ‘in the certainty that something can be done to 
prevent the repetition of cases like this that do not prestige us in the eyes of 
Americans’. The decision of the Minister, written in the letter, recommended 
sending the whole process to the Directorate General of Higher Education, 
‘asking to enable us to respond to the Embassy, to whose fair repairs we ask your 
attention’.24 
The American Embassy in Lisbon and the role of the Cultural 
Attaché  
 
In the early 1950s, the intensity of cultural and educational exchanges between 
Portugal and the United States began to grow. This situation reflected the 
growing globalization of the Cold War and, in bilateral terms, the stabilization of 
political and military relations provided by the bilateral agreements of 1951. In 
1950, the Department of State had prepared a ‘Policy Statement’ on Portugal and 
defined as the four major objectives of American policy towards Portugal: ‘to 
maintain and improve existing cordial relations… to ensure continuation and 
development of the facilities now granted to us in the Azores… to encourage 
Portuguese participation in efforts to achieve economic, political, and military 
integration in western Europe and coordination in North Atlantic area… to aid in 
the economic and strategic development of Portugal's large African 
possessions’.25  
These closer political and economic relations were matched on the 
cultural level by the appointment of a new cultural attaché to the US Embassy in 
Lisbon, in March 1951, just two months after the signing of the 'Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement' between Portugal and the United States. Leroy Benoit had 
a PhD from Harvard Univeristy and was a former member of the OSS (Office of 
Strategic Services). In 1951, according to his own words, the State Department 
had picked him from Johns Hopkins University ‘to exercise for four years, the 
post of cultural attache at the US Embassy in Lisbon’. His action was undoubtedly 
instrumental in developing the cultural diplomacy of the United States in 
Portugal.26 As historian Peter Arndt pointed out, even during World War II the 
Division of Cultural Relations, from the Department of State, was already 
‘recruiting university intellectuals for the field and area scholars moved into 
numerous embassies’ based on the principle that ‘sophisticated field 
representation was indispensable’. These ‘cultural diplomats’ were the 
‘intellectual nerve centers and pump primers for enticing university scholars and 
students, intellectuals and educators into bilateral dialogue’, something that was 
much needed in Lisbon, from the US point of view. In many instances, just like in 
Lisbon, the ‘cultural officer’ would remain ‘attached’ to the embassy, even if he 
was not an official diplomat.27  
In an interview to the Portuguese newspaper República, in May 1953, 
Leroy Benoit described the activities undertaken his first two years in Lisbon:  
 
‘the cultural exchange of students and professors that I have been promoting 
between Portugal and the United States with scholarships; the number of 
conferences that I made in the country that hosts me and the numerous visits to 
the United States that I promoted, with expenses paid by the US Government, of 
high Portuguese officials, occupying posts of command and with civil influence in 
industry, commerce, education, science, and arts, in order to observe and study 
the life, services, institutions, working methods in the United States, to learn 
practical and useful lessons, perhaps applicable to Portugal’.28  
 
In 1952, he claimed, two professors and a high official from the Ministry of 
Education had gone to the United States for a six months period, ‘with 
scholarships [...] transport and accommodation paid, with round trips offered’. 
They had visited Texas, Indiana and New York. As for students, thirteen had 
travelled to the United States, covering diversified areas, such as arts, sciences 
and literature, ‘with scholarships for ten months in the amount of $ 1,600 on 
average, including accommodation, food and a certain amount for daily personal 
expenses’. For 1953 it was expected that fifteen Portuguese students visited the 
United States ‘with similar scholarships’, as well as ‘several professors’. On the 
other hand, in 1952, ‘several American professors with scholarships’ had come 
to Portugal to research in Portuguese archives’. One of them was a professor of 
‘agricultural sciences’ that had moved to the ‘Agricultural Regents Schools of 
Santarem, Evora and Coimbra’. In 1953, he assured, ‘another US agricultural 
technician will come to Portugal, to continue the work started last year’.29 
The Fulbright Program in Portugal 
 
Although the numbers presented by Leroy Benoit marked a significant departure 
from the previous period, it was not until the late 1950s that the US and Portugal 
began negotiations for the development of the Fulbright program in Portugal. 
Recent historiography claimed that the last years of this decade witnessed a 
period of intense transatlantic cultural relations and this was certainly the case 
of US-Portugal relations.30  
In April 1957, the US Embassy in Lisbon proposed to the Portuguese 
government the signature of an exchange agreement. The US government, “by its 
exclusive initiative, was willing to celebrate a cultural agreement with our 
country, remaining fully responsible for the funding”31. The US government 
proposed the creation of a binational “Commission for Educational Exchange” to 
administer the program in Portugal, similar to the comissions that already 
existed in other countries 
The US initiative regarding the Fulbright agreement with Portugal was 
part of a second wave of bilateral Fulbright agreements that took place in the late 
1950s. These new agreements were made possible due to the new financial 
provisions of the program. In 1954, US Congress had approved a provision 
dealing with ‘surplus agricultural commodity sales abroad’. This provision 
‘enabled exchanges to continue in some countries where surplus property [...] 
proceeds were exhausted. It also allowed extending exchanges in the mid 1950s 
to additional countries [...] where there had been no binational agreements’.32 In 
the following years, as Richard Arndt pointed out, new Fulbright agreements 
were signed with countries like Portugal, Cyprus, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Tunisia, 
and Yugoslavia, among others.33 
It should also be noted that this American offer came at a delicate period 
of Portuguese-American relations. With the end of the European colonial 
empires and the globalization of the Cold War, the United States was changing its 
African policy and its position regarding European colonialism. Portugal, one of 
the remaining colonial poweres, resented this new US attitude since 1954, when 
the Eisenhower administration refused to make a public statement condemning 
the actions of the Indian Government in the Portuguese enclaves in India.34 For 
the first time since World War II, Portugal was faced with the reluctance of the 
United States to support its colonial policy and the Portuguese government 
immediately suspended negotiations for the renewal of the Azores agreement 
(which would end in December 1956) until the Eisenhower administration 
approved the so-called Dulles–Cunha memorandum, in 1955. This memorandum 
recognized the existence of ‘Portuguese provinces’ — instead of colonies — in 
Asia. The subtle distinction was crucial for the Portuguese, who claimed they did 
not have an empire or any colonies in Africa or Asia, but instead ‘overseas 
provinces’ with the same constitutional status as the ‘continental provinces’.35  
Nevertheless, the Portuguese government delayed negotiations on the 
Azores as much as it could. In the last day of 1956, US Ambassador Bonbright 
met personally with Oliveira Salazar and was faced with a proposal for a one-
year extension. He replied the American government had every reason to be 
concerned with the situation in the Azores and it was not ‘prepared to go ahead 
now, on the basis of a one year prolongation’. Salazar said that part of the delay 
had been ‘purely fortuitous’, but he recognized that a ‘series of events’ had 
caused the Portuguese government to reflect on the ‘desirability’ of a new 
agreement. The Portuguese leader told the Ambassador he was ‘disturbed about 
the directions which American foreign policy is taking’. The Ambassador 
observed that the American government believed the Azores base should be 
considered separately and ‘on its merits’ because it was a matter ‘involving our 
mutual defense and it was a contribution which both countries were able to 
make as members of the NATO alliance’. Salazar replied that Portugal had 
interests ‘scattered in Africa and Asia’, and wanted to be sure that American 
policies were not ‘prejudicial to those interests’. He argued that the Americans 
‘could not expect Portugal to make concessions to the United States in the 
Azores’ if their policies ‘should result in harm’ to Portugal in other parts of the 
globe. Salazar reiterated the offer for an additional year of permanence in the 
Azores and the American Ambassador accepted, although he expressed his 
‘personal disappointment’ as well as that of his government.36  
Negotiations for the renewal of the Azores base continued throughout 
1957 and it was in this delicate political context that, in April 1957, the American 
Embassy proposed the celebration of the Fulbright agreement with Portugal. 
This initiative certainly is a clear example of the role of cultural elations and the 
importance of cultural diplomacy, since it helped to improve the climate between 
the two countries. The new agreement on the Azores would be signed a few 
months later, in November 1957, allowing for the continuation of the existing 
conditions until 31 December 1962.37 The two governments also signed several 
‘Technical Agreements’, by which the United States agreed to ‘modernize the 
existing equipment’ of the Portuguese Armed Forces, with special relevance to 
the Portuguese Air Force. The United States would provide in the near future five 
C-54 aircraft, and one squadron of F-86F jet fighters, ‘plus the necessary 
equipment and training of personnel to man the squadron’. After the five year 
period the United States would also guarantee ‘four more C-54s’ and ‘fuel, spare 
parts, etc., for all aircraft indicated above.38 
After receiving the initial American proposal for a Fulbright agreement, in 
April 1957, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a first 
recomendation about the intended agreement and the bureaucratic process it 
needed to follow. There was nothing to ‘oppose regarding the objectives 
expressed in the agreement project’. Nevertheless, due to the ‘nature of the 
issues’ at stake, other departments within the Portuguese government should be 
consulted, such as the Ministries of Education, Finances and Economy. Given the 
political implications of the agreement, the leader of the Government, Oliveira 
Salazar, should also be consulted.39  
In this initial phase of consultations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
above all concerned with the financial aspects of the proposed agreement and 
wanted to know how much the American government was willing to spend, each 
year, on the Portuguese Fulbright program. Similarly to what it had done with 
other countries, the United States intended to finance the Fulbright program in 
Portugal through the ‘Agricultural Commodities Agreement’ it had signed with 
Portugal in May 1956.40 This agreement established that the money originated 
by the sale of agricultural commodities could be used by the United States to 
promote ‘international activities of cultural and educational exchange’.41 The 
money the United States was planning to spend in Portugal was part of the total 
amount of 3,7 million dollars mentioned in the item ‘International Exchange 
Program’ of the 1956 agreement.42 After the clarification of these aspects, the 
ministry of Finances issued, in August 1957, a statement saying that it had 
‘nothing to oppose’ to the proposal for a cultural agreement between the United 
States and Portugal.43  
The ministry of Education, on its turn, decided to send the process to the 
‘Institute for Higher Culture’, the Portuguese governmental agency responsible, 
among other things, for international educational exchanges. The director of this 
Institute was Cabral de Moncada, a conservative Law Professor at University of 
Coimbra known for his pro-German position during World War II and defined by 
historial Luís Torgal as a “cultural germanophile”.44 Moncada expressed strong 
reservations regarding the American proposal. On a memorandum dated 8 
September 1957, he admitted the agrement was of ‘great utility for us’. The 
Institute for Higher Culture would have ‘considerably enlarged its possibilities 
for total or partial funding of fellows and scholars in the United States, with great 
relief for its normal fund allocation for scientific research and cultural 
expansion’. Furthermore, this could be ‘an excellent tool for promoting 
Portuguese culture’ in the United States.45 
However, Moncada added, it seemed like the project had been conceived 
with a total ‘lack of knowledge’ of how Portuguese ‘cultural institutions’ were 
organized. He was particularly upset because the projected agreement did not 
preview any kind of ‘collaborations or understanding’ between the new 
‘Commission for Educational Exchange’ and the Institute for Higher Culture or 
any other Portuguese cultural institution. Moreover, the funds allocated for 
American citizens who wanted to study in Portugal were far more substantial 
than the funds promised for Portuguese citizens who want to pursue their 
studies in the United States. Finally, according to Moncada, the projected 
Commission for Educational Exchange, responsible for the management of the 
programme and with its headquarters in Lisbon, looked much more like an 
‘independent cultural institution, almost like an autonomous American Institute’ 
than a ‘simple administrative organism, charged with the management of certain 
funds allocated by the government of the United States’.46 
According to this view, the Director of the Portuguese Institute for Higher 
Culture proposed further negotiations between the two governments in order to 
address several issues. First of all, it was necessary to stress the need for 
collaboration between the new ‘Commission for Educational Exchange’ and 
existing Portuguese cultural institutions, particularly the Institute for Higher 
Culture. Moncada suggested that the final version of the agreement should 
determine that the Commission would conceive and execute all its programs 
with collaboration of the Institute for Higher Culture, specially when they involve 
exchange of students, professors or researchers between Portugal and the 
United States.47 
This collaboration could be better obtained with changes in the proposed 
‘Board of Directors’. According to the initial project, the Commission would have 
two presidents: an honorary President (the US Ambassador in Lisbon) and an 
‘effective’ President, to be nominated by the US Ambassador. Both of them would 
have a vote in the Board of Directors. This arrangement, Moncada protested, 
would turn the Commission more into an ‘American institution’ than into an 
‘international or Portuguese-American’ institution. He proposed that the 
‘effective’ President should be designated alternatively by each government and 
that the honorary President should not have the right to vote.48 
Another point stressed by Moncada was the need for a more balanced 
distribution of funds between American and Portuguese students, putting an end 
to the different tretament received by American fellows in Portugal and 
Portuguese fellow in the US. According to Moncada, under the proposed deal, 
Portuguese students would only get payment of their travel, while American 
students in Portugal would obtain full funding for ‘travel, tuitions, accomodation 
and other expenses related to their academic activities’. Moncada believed that if 
this clause of the agreement was not modified ‘we would risk having [...] our 
schools full of rich Americans and [...] only a few poor Portuguese in America’.49 
These complaints stressed by Moncada were not uncommon. Since its 
origins the Fulbright program was characterized by the ‘assimetry’ in the 
relationship between the United States and the partner countries. As historian 
Sam Lebovic stresses, ‘from the negotiations of exchange treaties, to the selection 
of board representatives and exchange visitors, asymmetries of power undercut 
claims to mutual exchange’. According to this author, the Fulbright program was 
indeed a ‘project for the political transmission of American culture abroad’ and 
this was the reason why the State Department was responsible for negotiations 
with other governments. There were official recommendations for an ‘American 
and educational flavor’ of the binational boards responsible for the 
administration of the Fulbright program in each country. This meant American 
‘negotiators were instructed to achieve American majorities on the foundation 
boards and to keep them free from foreign educational control’.50 Even in the 
cases where ‘a foreign government, usually European, was able to secure half the 
votes on the board, they remained unequal partners’ because ‘the Chairman of 
these Boards, with a casting vote and ability to appoint other members, was 
always American. Secondly, the decisions and budget of the board would be 
subject to review by the State Department.51 The problem of funding Portuguese 
students in the US was also part of a broader issue. Since the beginning of the 
Fulbright program there was the problem of funds for foreign fellows: ‘dollars 
had to be found to pay costs incurred in the United States’, because the Fulbright 
funds would only provide for ‘international travel’.52 
With the agreement on the Azores completed in late 1957, conversations 
between the two governments regarding the Fulbright program began in April 
1958. When the members of the Portuguese government met with the American 
officiers, they presented to them the issues that had been raised by the several 
Ministries involved and also the objections raised by Cabral Moncada. The US 
representatives clarified some technical aspects of the proposed agreement. A 
financial report of the Fulbright program should be made every year and sent to 
the Secretary of State and to the Portuguese government. The total amount to be 
spent in the program depended on the amount of money in foreign currency 
generated from the sale of American agricultural surplus. Therefore, if there was 
more money available, conditions for Portuguese students could also be 
improved53.  
 The American diplomats also replied to Moncada’s objections, explaining 
that Portuguese students going to the United States under this program would 
have their tickets paid in Portuguese currency (escudos), but not their living 
expenses in the United States, because that could not be paid in Portuguese 
currency. On the other hand, the US officers rejected Moncada’s suggestion that 
the Board of Directors could be presided by an American and a Portuguese 
member, alternating every other year. The United States was simply following a 
procedure that was similar to all other Fulbright agreements. As far as the 
collaboration with the Institute for Higher Culture, the Americans suggested that 
the Portuguese members of the Board could be indicated by the Institute.54 
These replies were transmitted to Moncada in August 1958. He did not 
answer until late October 1958, with another lenghty Memorandum. Moncada 
considered that the justifications presented by the American Embassy did not 
reply to his main objections. The Fulbright Commission to be created in Lisbon 
would have a ‘unilateral’ flavor, much more than a ‘bilateral’ one. There would 
also be an ‘enourmous difference’ between the ‘possibilities of Americans in 
Portugal’ and the possibilities of ‘Portuguese in the United States’. Moncada 
stressed that, ‘without a minimum of equality of conditions between the 
American fellows in Portugal and the Portuguese fellows in America’, not even 
the presence of four Portuguese members in the ‘Board of Directors’, ‘always 
presided by two American presidents’, would avoid the existence of a ‘truly 
American cultural base in our territory’ instead of a ‘Portuguese-American 
international cultural center’. Neverthelss, even under the present conditions, 
Moncada admitted that the projected agreement would undoubtedly bring great 
‘advantages’ to the Portuguese-American cultural exchanges.55 
In November 1958, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied and 
commented on Moncada’s report. Portuguese diplomacy was naturally more 
interested in achieving the agreement and did not share the “nationalistic” 
position of Moncada. In the opinion of Almeida Coutinho, the ‘total expenses’ of 
the program are assured by the ‘American treasure’ and the unilateral, rather 
than bilateral, character of the agreement was a ‘natural consequence of that 
circumstance’. Thoese were the conditions, and the Portuguese government 
should now simply decide if, under these circunstances ‘the agreement is 
favorable to Portugal’ and if it was willing to sign it. Coutinho reminded that ‘the 
Americans had signed numerous similar agreements with other countries and 
are not willing to change conditions already approved by the Congress’.56 
While these discussions were taking place, the US signed a similar 
agreement with Spain with the declared goal of furthering “mutual 
understanding between the peoples of Spain and the United States through a 
wider exchange of knowledge and professional skills”57. Two months later, in 
February 1959, the final version of the agreement was sent to the Ministry of 
Education by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying there was no time for further 
negotiations58. The signature of the agreement with Spain, in November 16, 
1958, certainly contributed to expediting this matter in Portugal. In the delicate 
Iberian political balance, the Portuguese government wanted to avoid the 
appearance of being left behind by the United States. 
Conclusion 
 
The Fulbright agreement between Portugal and the United States would be 
signed by both goverments on 19 March 1960. Its major goal was to develop an 
educational exchange program between the two countries. Portugal was the 37th 
country in the world to sign a Fulbright agreement with the United States. The 
exchange of students and professors would be directed by the newly created 
‘Luso-American Cultural Commission’, also known as the Fulbright Commission, 
composed by eight members, with equal number of Americans and Portuguese 
and having the US ambassador in Lisbon as honorary President.59 
The Fulbright agreement between Portugal and the United States marked 
the beginning of a new phase in terms of cultural relations between the two 
countries and of US cultural diplomacy in Portugal. Educational, cultural and 
scientific exchanges were no longer the result of individual initiatives, as they 
were in the beginning of the Cold War, or of the activity of the US embassy in 
Lisbon. The activities of the Fulbright Comission started in June 1960, after the 
appointment of an ‘Executive Secretary’.60 
The first year of activity of the LACC and the Fulbright program in 
Portugal was evidently experimental. Nevertheless, three Portuguese university 
professors and four college students went to the United States. During this year, 
there was also a US ‘specialist’ placed at the Faculdade de Letras of Lisbon 
University. Moreover, the Fulbright Program also allowed Fulbright students and 
scholars in other European countries to travel to Lisbon and this happened in six 
instances. 61  In the academic year 1961-2, the Fulbright Comission gave 
scholarships to nine Portuguese students, in areas that ranged from Civil 
Engineering to Medicine, from Social Sciences to Music. In October 1961, a group 
of six American Fulbright students arrived in Lisbon to attend courses of 
Portuguese Culture at Faculdade de Letras of Lisbon University. These students 
received an ‘orientation course’ with the participation of distinguished 
Portuguese scholars, such as Virgínia Rau, Maria de Lourdes Belchior, Lindley 
Cintra and Jacinto do Prado Coelho. 62 
Portuguese-American cultural and educational relations had reached a 
new level in the early 1960s. This was the result of the Fulbright agreement and 
of the negotiations that had been conducted since 1957. As mentioned above, the 
American proposal had come at crucial moment of US-Portuguese relations in 
the context of the Cold War and it certainly had an impact in these bilateral 
relations, helping to improve the climate between the countries and to pave the 
way for the signature of the 1957 agreement on the Azores. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that in this case cultural diplomacy had a significant impact 
in terms of the larger history of US-Portugal relations during the Cold War 
period.  
In the early 1960s, however, other developments would compromise this 
situation. A few months after the signature of the Fulbright agreement, the first 
anti-colonial incidents took place in Angola, in February 1961. With the new 
Kennedy administration, Portugal would face, for the first time since World War 
II, outright opposition from the United States to its colonial policy. In March 
1961, President Kennedy administration decided to vote in favor of a United 
Nations Security Council resolution calling on the Portuguese government to 
‘urgently’ introduce ‘measures and reforms in Angola’.63 The resolution was not 
approved, but the favorable vote of the U.S. delegation would mark the beginning 
of the most serious crisis in Portuguese-American relations during the Cold 
War.64 
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